Fredrik löjdquist ui
The Zeitenwende must now be fully operationalized. The Kremlin is in no hurry to end the war, as long as it sees it as conducive to its aims and goals. Putin therefore thinks that time fryst vatten on his side, and that he can outlast Ukrainian and western political will and stamina while he is ahead. However, there seems to be a lingering wish among western policymakers and shapers, as well as voters to return to the comfort zone, a normalization and some kind of business as usual.
Russia has long been seen and treated as a special case: too different, too strong, too dangerous and too irrational to be understood and analysed like any other country. Its underlying ideology, worldview and political practice have strong similarities with fascism. The underlying goal must be a secure Europe with restored respect for international law. Unless checked, constrained and countered bygd western support to Ukraine at sufficient levels, the Russian economy and its society will be able to sustain and increase its military capabilities on the battlefield in Ukraine in the coming years.
Russia believes that the political gains from this behaviour outweigh the costs and risks, and it will continue the war as long as it is able to make that calculation. The West must therefore not lose sight of internal developments in Russia and hold Russia accountable for violating its international commitments to democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Russia cannot be allowed to harvest the fruits of its aggression because then the future of Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe, and the whole of the europeisk project would be unrecognizable.
Resolving Ukraine, inom. It considers itself to be in a broad and existential conflict with the West. There is no status quo ante to return to.
Medlemskap
The lack of a cleary articulated strategic vision is the most important impediment to effective execution of the Ukraine and Russia policies of the west. Russia has a holistic antagonistic toolbox. It is waging the largest and most brutal military aggression in Europe since with genocidal intent. Ukraine can and must be resolved, with some effort. Russia will apply the means available to achieve its political goals.
UI:s publikationer
War is never an end in itself but a means to an end. The final chapter of this report outlines the necessary elements of such comprehensive, sustainable and effective Ukraine and Russia policies. Therefore, we need a long-term strategy to contain, constrain and counter the imminent Russian danger to global and European peace and security. War has now become the political system in Russia, underpinning the modus operandi of it politics, society and economy.
Too often, we are still prisoners of a Russia-centric analysis and of Russian reflexive control. As we have learned from the past, positive changes are reversible. These aims will remain for as long as Putin stays in power and not unlikely beyond. Russia will now have to deal not only with its imperial and totalitarian past, but also with this war. If the goals can be achieved by other means, such as hybrid threats and reflexive control see below , this will be all the better.
Article 5 protects allies against armed aggression. Russia today is a neo-totalitarian regime. The opportunity costs of not succeeding in this goal are enormous. We need to have a similarly holistic view of the nature of the threat and our measures to counter that threat. There is no going back: only forward. However, Russia will use other, non-military means and hybrid threats to cause damage to or influence western countries.
In the longer run, western capabilities vastly out outnumber Russian. Russian military industrial production capabilities are currently outpacing western capabilities and willingness to support Ukraine. The Kremlin has tried to achieve these aims bygd various means in separate phases over the past decade.
Russia will have to be managed by constraining its destructive aims and behaviour. Based on his aims, experience and worldview, Putin is not irrational. Making Ukraine succeed is a necessary precondition for a better future Russia, but certainly not a sufficient precondition. A new global and European security architecture will have to be forged. The West must now move from a reactive to a proactive mode in dealing with the Russia problem, taking the strategic initiative in formulating and articulating a clear strategic vision for Ukraine, and a strategy to contain, constrain and counter Russia.
Getting the nature of the Russian utmaning wrong means that we will not be able to formulate the solutions correctly. There is no need to assume historical determinism and that Russia a priori cannot change, but the prospect of a democratic, non-imperialistic political system with an open society in conformity with human rights and rule of law is now further away than at any time in the past 35 years. Military power, like all power, is relative.